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Abstract
Privacy is today an important concern for both data
providers and data users. Data generalization can
provide significant protection of an individual’s pri-
vacy, which means the data value can be replaced by
a less specific but semantically consistent value and
the personal information can be collected in a gen-
eralized form. However, over-generalized data may
render data of little value. A key question is whether
or not a certain generalization strategy provides a suf-
ficient level of privacy and usability?
In this paper, we introduce a new approach, called
privacy-aware generalization boundaries, which can
satisfy the requirements of both data providers and
data users. We propose a privacy-aware access con-
trol model related to a retention period. Formal def-
initions of authorization actions and rules are pre-
sented. Further, we discuss how to manage a valid
access process and analysis the access control policy.
Finally, we extend our model to support highly com-
plex privacy-related policies by taking into account
features of obligations and conditions.
1 Introduction
Privacy is the right of individuals to determine for
themselves when, how, and to what extent private
information is communicated to others. Privacy con-
cerns are fueled by an ever increasing list of privacy vi-
olations, ranging from privacy accidents to illegal ac-
tions. Many people are aware that giving personally
identifiable information (PII) to organizations may
result in the data being used in ways the person never
intended.
While current information technology enables peo-
ple to carry out their business virtually at any time in
any place, it also provides the capability to store vari-
ous types of information the users reveal during their
activities. The use of innovative knowledge extraction
techniques combined with advanced data integration
and correlation techniques makes it possible to au-
tomatically extract a large body of information from
available databases and from a large variety of infor-
mation repositories available on the web (Dong et al.
2005, Sarawagi & Bhamidipaty 2002). Privacy issues
are further exacerbated by the Internet which makes
it easy for new data to be automatically collected and
added to databases (Sandhu et al. 1996, Westin 1998,
1999).
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As privacy awareness increases, individuals are
becoming more reluctant to carry out business and
transactions online, and many enterprises are losing a
considerable amount of potential profits. Also, enter-
prises that collect information about individuals are
in effect obligated to keep the collected information
private and must strictly control the use of such in-
formation. Thus, information stored in the databases
of an enterprise is not only a valuable property of the
enterprise, but also a costly responsibility. By demon-
strating good privacy practices, many enterprises try
to utilize information analysis and knowledge extrac-
tion to provide better services to individuals with-
out violating individual privacy. As privacy becomes
a major concern for both customers and enterprises,
many privacy protecting access control models have
been proposed (Adam & Worthmann 1989, Agrawal
et al. 2002, Ashley et al. 2002, LeFevre et al. 2004).
Changes in the landscape of legislation around the
world, and growing consumer attention to the is-
sue have changed attitudes towards security and pri-
vacy concerns for database systems. This matches
with a substantial body of research on approaches
for managing the negotiation of personal information
among customers and enterprises (Tumer et al. 2003,
Agrawal et al. 2003, Seamons et al. 2001).
At the basis of every solution for the exchange be-
tween enterprises and customers, there is the princi-
ple of transparency. Transparency means that when
enterprises store data about customers they should
disclose to customers which data is collected and how
it is used; i.e., for what purpose data is maintained.
Starting from the landmark proposals for Hippocratic
databases (Agrawal et al. 2002), most privacy-aware
technologies use purpose as a central concept around
which privacy protection is built. Byun and Bertino
(Byun & Bertino 2006) proposed a model based on a
typical life-cycle of data concerning individuals. Each
data item is generalized and stored according to a
multilevel organization, where each level corresponds
to a specific privacy level. When individuals release
their personal information, they specify permissible
usages of each of their data items and a level of pri-
vacy for each usage.
The use of data generalization1 can significantly
increase the comfort level of data providers; i.e., the
personal information can be collected in a general-
ized form. For example, many individuals may not be
comfortable with their birthdays being used. Suppose
now that the enterprise promises its customers that
this information will be used only in a generalized
form. This assurance will surely comfort many cus-
tomers. Although more information can be utilized
by employing data generalization techniques, the abil-
ity to limit the level of allowed generalization could be
valuable. For example, when the address information
1Data generalization refers to techniques that “replace a value
with a less specific but semantically consistent value.”
related to Australia states is used for some specific
data analysis tasks, the states should be the maxi-
mal allowed generalization values. Therefore, the ad-
dress information generalized beyond the state could
be useless.
A key question is: how can we determine whether
or not a certain generalization strategy provides a suf-
ficient level of privacy and usability?
To answer this question, we need metrics that
methodologically measure the privacy and usability
of generalized data. Such metrics are necessary to de-
vise generalization techniques that satisfy the require-
ments of both data providers and data users. Further,
privacy enhancing access control models should be
able to utilize more information by employing data
generalization techniques.
In this paper, we devise the generalization bound-
ary technique to maximize the privacy and informa-
tion utilization, which satisfies the requirements of
both data providers and data users. Moreover, we
propose a privacy-aware access control model related
to a retention period. Compared with traditional ac-
cess model, we focus on retention period and gener-
alization level to provide a much finer level of con-
trol since the access control decision is based on the
question of “how much information can be allowed
for a certain user”, rather than “is information al-
lowed for a certain user or not”. Further, we present
efficient authorization and access functions to man-
age the process of accessing. Finally, we extend our
model by taking obligations and conditions into ac-
count to provide full support for expressing highly
complex privacy-related policies.
The remainder of the paper is structured as fol-
lows. In Section 2, we describe the motivation of
the paper. We present a privacy-aware generalization
strategy while specifying the generalization bound-
aries in Section 3 and illustrate the privacy-aware ac-
cess control model in Section 4. In Section 5, we
propose efficient authorization and access functions
to manage the process of accessing. We extend our
model to provide full support for expressing highly
complex privacy-related policies, taking into account
features like obligations and conditions in Section 6.
We provide a brief survey of related work in Section
7 and conclude the paper in Section 8.
2 Motivation
Following (Byun & Bertino 2006), privacy level, types
of data and possible data usages (i.e., purposes) are
defined in Table 1. During the data collection phase, a
data provider submits his/her privacy requirements,
which specify permissible usages of each data item
and a level of privacy for each usage. For instance,
a data provider2 may select Low on Address for
Admin; that is, he/she does not have any privacy
concern over the address information when it is used
for the purpose of administration. Thus, the address
information can be used for the administrative pur-
pose without any modification. However, the data
provider may select High on Address for Marketing.
This indicates that he/she has great concerns about
privacy of the address information when it is used for
the purpose of marketing; thus, the address informa-
tion should be used only in a sufficiently generalized
form for the marketing purpose.
In addition to storing the specified privacy require-
ments, the actual data items are preprocessed in the
following way before being stored. Each data item is
2Data provider refers to the subject to whom the stored data is
related.
generalized and stored according to a multilevel or-
ganization, where each level corresponds to a specific
privacy level. Intuitively, data for a higher privacy
level requires a higher degree of generalization. For
instance, the address data is stored in three levels:
entire address for Low, city and state for Medium
and state for High.
Table 2 illustrates some fractional records and pri-
vacy requirements stored in a conceptual database re-
lation. Note that each data item is stored in three
different generalization levels, Low,Medium,High,
each of which corresponds to a particular privacy
level. Intuitively, data for a higher privacy level re-
quires a higher degree of generalization. Admin and
Marketing are metadata columns storing the set of
privacy levels of data for Admin and Marketing pur-
poses, respectively. For instance, {M, H, H} in Mar-
keting indicates that for the Marketing purpose the
privacy level of Name is Medium while the privacy
levels of Address and Income are both High.
Along with the data collection, access to the data
is strictly governed by the data provider’s require-
ments. However, different people may have different
feelings about their information being used for some
purposes. For instance, some consumers may feel that
it is acceptable to disclose their purchase history or
browsing habits in return for better services; others
may feel that revealing such information violates their
privacy. These differences in individuals suggest that
access control models should be able to maximize in-
formation utility, which may be neglected by data
providers although wanted by data users. For exam-
ple, if a data provider selects {M, M, M} on Name,
Address, Income for Delivery purpose, the informa-
tion obtained by the data user is shown in Table 3.
However, the information will be useless for the data
user who wants to fulfill the delivery purpose because
full name and address are necessary information for
delivery purpose. Further, this selection may increase
the chance of disclosure of the unnecessary informa-
tion Income since the more people who know, the
more likely it would be disclosed.
We believe that a new generation of privacy-aware
access control models should maximize information
usability by exploiting the nature of information pri-
vacy. In order to balance privacy and utility, it is
necessary to devise generalization strategies that sat-
isfy the requirements of both data providers and data
users. In this paper, we propose the privacy-aware
access control model with generalization boundaries,
which maximizes the individual privacy and private
information utility. In particular, we
• Develop the privacy-aware access control model
by taking retention period into account, since per-
sonal information shall be retained only as long as
necessary for fulllment of the purpose.
• Discuss how to management a valid access and
we propose an efficient access control policy to iden-
tify relevant issues based on our proposed privacy-
aware access control model
• Extend the privacy-aware access control model
to provide full support for expressing highly complex
privacy-related policies, taking into account features
like obligations and conditions.
3 Privacy with generalization boundaries
Generalization that consists in replacing the actual
value of the attribute with a less specific, more general
value is faithful to the original (Sweeney 2002). For
example, the name ‘Carol Jones’ can be generalized to
a less specific value ‘C. Jones’ or further generalized
Term Description Example
Privacy level Level of privacy required by data provider Low, Medium, High
Data item Types of data being collected (i.e. attributes) Name, Address, Income
Data usage type Types of potential data usage (i.e. purpose) Marketing, Admin, Delivery
Table 1: Privacy level, data type and data usage type
Name Address Income Admin Marketing Delivery
L Alice Park L 123 First St.,Seattle,WA L 45,000
M A. Park M Seattle,WA M 40K-60K {L,M,H} {M,H,H} {M,M,M}
H A.P. H WA H Under 100K
Table 2: Privacy information and Metadata
Name Address Income Delivery
A. Park Seattle,WA 40K-60K {M,M,M}
Table 3: Private information for Delivery purpose
to ‘C.J.’. Initially, this technique was used for cat-
egorical attributes and employed predefined domain
and value generalization hierarchies. Generalization
was extended to numerical attributes either by using
predefined hierarchies (Iyengar 2002) or a hierarchy-
free model (LeFevre et al. 2006).
For each categorical attribute, a domain general-
ization hierarchy is associated. The values from dif-
ferent domains of this hierarchy are represented in a
tree-like structure, calleda value generalization hier-
archy.
There are several ways to perform generalization.
Generalization that maps all values of initial data to a
more general domain in its domain generalization hi-
erarchy is called full-domain generalization (LeFevre
et al. 2006, Samarati 2001). Generalization can also
map an attribute’s values to different domains in its
domain generalization hierarchy, each value being re-
placed by the same generalized value in the entire
dataset. The least restrictive generalization, called
cell level generalization (Lunacek et al. 2006), extends
Iyengar model (Iyengar 2002) by allowing the same
value to be mapped to different generalized values in
distinct tuples. In this paper, we adopt cell level gen-
eralization.
By using data generalization, data providers can
specify their privacy requirements using a privacy
level for each data item. Data for a higher privacy
level requires a higher degree of generalization, i.e.,
each privacy level is accompanied with a generaliza-
tion level. Therefore, we assume that the generaliza-
tion level is equal to the privacy level in this paper.
The maximal generalization level is to generalize a
data value to ∗, denoted as ML. For simplicity of
discussion, we only consider the generalization lev-
els: low L, medium M , high H and ML. Figure 1
illustrates the generalization level and value general-
ization hierarchy for the attribute Address.
In order to specify a generalization boundary, we
introduce the concept of a maximum allowed gener-
alization level that is associated with each data item.
This concept is used to express to what extent the
data user thinks the data item could be generalized,
such that the resulted generalized data item would
still be useful. Limiting the level of generalization for
the data item is necessary for various usage of the
data. For instance, when data related to Australian
states is used for some specific analysis tasks, the data
user will select the level corresponding to the states
as the maximal allowed generalization level. Address
information generalized beyond the Australia state
level could be useless. In this case, the only solution
would be to ask the data provider to make a decreased
level of generalization until the generalized data satis-
fies the maximum allowed generalization level require-
123 Frist St.,Seattle,WA
Seattle,WA
WA
*
L
M
H
ML
Figure 1: Example of Address generalization
ment (i.e., no address is generalized further than the
Australian state).
Definition 1 (Maximum allowed generaliza-
tion level) Let D be the set of data items and P
be the set of purposes, then for each data item d ∈ D
and purpose p ∈ P , the maximum allowed gen-
eralization level of d under purpose p, denoted by
MAGLel(d, p), satisfies:
• the data item d is permitted to be generalized only
up to MAGLel(d, p).
For example, if D = {Name, Address, Income}, P
= {Admin, Marking, Delivery}, then we can define
the maximum allowed generalization level of Name
under purpose Delivery, MAGLel(Name,Delivery)
= L.
Note that the maximum allowed generalization
level of the data could be different to different pur-
poses. For example, the maximum allowed general-
ization level of address could be Low for Delivery
purpose; whereas, it may be high for Marketing pur-
pose. Usually, for a certain purpose, the data user
only has generalization restrictions for some neces-
sary data items, e.g., there should be restrictions on
Name and Address for Delivery purpose but no re-
strictions on Income. If for a particular data item
there are no any restrictions in respect to its gener-
alization, then the maximal generalization level ML
is specified for the usage of this data. In this case,
the requirement of providing sufficient privacy and
usability is satisfied by the following description.
Definition 2 (Privacy-aware generalization
boundaries) Let P be the set of access purposes and
D be the set of data items, then for each purpose
p ∈ P , the set Np ⊆ D denotes all necessary
data to fulfill the purpose p. The privacy-aware
generalization boundaries for p satisfies:
• for ∀d ∈ Np, the data d is permitted to be general-
ized only up to MAGLel(d, p);
Name Address Income Delivery
L Alice Park L 123 First St.,Seattle,WA L 45,000 {MAGLel(Name, Delivery),
M A. Park M Seattle,WA M 40K-60K MAGLel(Address, Delivery),
H A.P. H WA H Under 100K ML}
ML * ML * ML *
Table 4: Generalization boundaries for Delivery purpose
Name Address Income Delivery
Alice Park 123 First St., Seattle,WA * {L,L,ML}
Table 5: Ideal information for Delivery purpose
• for ∀d /∈ Np and d ∈ D, the data d is permitted to
be generalized up to ML.
For instance, if D = {Name, Address, Income},
P = {Admin, Marking, Delivery}, and since the
full name and address are necessary to fulfill the
Delivery purpose, so NDelivery = {Name, Ad-
dress}. Table 4 shows the example of privacy-
aware generalization boundaries for the Delivery
purpose. Because of Name,Address ∈ NDelivery,
the generalizations on Name and Address are only
permitted up to MAGLel(Name,Delivery) and
MAGLel(Address,Delivery) (i.e., Low and Low),
respectively. On the other hand, for the Income,
there is no any requirements with respect to its gen-
eralization, since Income /∈ NDelivery, so the maxi-
mal generalization level ML is specified for the usage
of Income. According to the permissible usage of
each data item, a data user can obtain the informa-
tion shown in Table 5. The proposed generalization
boundary strategy balances privacy and usability, sat-
isfying the requirements of both data providers and
data users.
4 Privacy-aware Access Control Model
Access control technology can be used as a starting
point for managing PII data in a trustworthy fashion.
But there are important principles of privacy manage-
ment that require us to extend the traditional view
of access control. Traditionally, the access decision is
always binary; i.e., a data access is either ‘allowed’ or
‘denied’. In this section, we present a specialized ac-
cess control model that exploits the subtle nature of
information privacy to maximize information utility
with privacy guarantees.
4.1 Preliminaries
As a prerequisite to our model, supported elements
have to be clearly defined and clarified.
• Data Users: Data users are individuals who ac-
cess or receive data. Data users are required in a
privacy context, as privacy policies will depend on
the relationship between the individual requesting
data and in the individual whom the data is related
to. For example, one type of data users might be
physician while another might be primary care
physician. We denote U as the set of data users in
this paper.
• Privilege: Some privacy policies make distinctions
about who can perform activities based on the ac-
tion being performed. For example, a policy might
state that anyone in the company can create a cus-
tomer record, but that only certain data users are
allowed to read that record. We denote Priv as
the set of privileges.
• Purposes: Data access requests are made for a spe-
cific purpose or purposes. This represents how the
data is going to be used by the recipient. For ex-
ample, the data may be used for Marketing or
Delivery purposes. We denote P as the set of pur-
poses.
• Generalization Level : Generalization level refers to
to what extent the data items have been gener-
alized. For example, a Low generalization level
on Address means the address information can be
used without any modification. We denote GL as
the set of private levels, which consists of L, M , H,
and ML.
• Retention Period : Retention period refers to how
long the information is stored. For example, if the
retention period for Name is one month, it means
the name information can only be retained for one
month. We use time intervals to describe retention
period, e.g., [12/02/2008, 12/03/2008]. We denote
T as the set of time intervals.
4.2 Authorizations
Since the access to the data items is strictly governed
by the data provider’s requirements, authorizations
to access a data item in specific generalization level
are usually required prior to the access. In addition to
the traditional access factors: data items, data users
and privileges, all the authorizations in this paper
are extended to include the specific purpose and the
generalization level of each data item.
Definition 3 A generalized authorization is a 5-
tuple (u, d, priv, p, gl), where u ∈ U , d ∈ D, priv ∈
Priv, p ∈ P , gl ∈ GL.
As previously mentioned, D is the set of data
items. The tuple (u, d, priv, p, gl) states that
the data user u has been authorized to per-
form priv on the data item d under generalization
level gl for purpose p. For example, the tuple
(Tom, address, access, delivery, L) denotes that Tom
was authorized with privilege access of the customer’s
address at Low generalization level for the delivery
purpose.
Moreover, personal information shall be retained
only as long as necessary for the fulfillment of the pur-
pose for which it has been collected. If a certain data
item was collected for a set of purposes, it is kept for
the limited retention period of the purpose. We refer
to an authorization together with its usage time as a
temporal generalized authorization. A time interval
is also associated with each authorization, imposing
lower and upper bounds to the potential usage.
Definition 4 A temporal generalized authorization
is a 6-tuple (t, u, d, priv, p, gl), where t ∈ T , u ∈ U ,
d ∈ D, priv ∈ Priv, p ∈ P , gl ∈ GL.
Initial Authori- Checking
Deny
Accessing
Revoke
Endzation
permitaccess requestgeneralization
denied revoke privilege
endaccess
data
Figure 2: The state transition of privacy-aware access control actions
A tuple ([ta, tb], u, d, priv, p, gl) states that the
data user u has been authorized to perform priv on
the data item d in the generalization level gl for the
purpose p in the time interval [ta, tb]. We denote AU
as the set of temporal generalized authorizations and
σau(∗) as the function used to extract the element(s)∗ in an authorization au ∈ AU .
A temporal generalized authorization au =
([12/06/2008, 10/08/2008], T om, income, read, admin,
M), it means that, between Jun. 12, 2008 and Aug.
10, 2008, Tom was authorized the privilege to read
the customer’s income at the generalization level
Medium for the admin purpose. Here, σau(t) refers
to the time interval [12/06/2008, 10/08/2008] and
σau(u, d, priv, p) returns to the tuple (Tom, income,
read, admin).
4.3 Authorization rules
In this section, authorization rules are introduced to
organize authorizations. The operations in the autho-
rizations are to grant/revoke privileges to/from data
users. Privileges are revoked in the following two sit-
uations:
(1) Revocation by time interval if the time interval
of authorizations is expired.
(2) Revocation by generalization level if the data
item is accessed in the wrong generalization level.
Further, an administrator of the system can make
a forced revocation decision. For example, if a secu-
rity administrator notices that a data user often sends
many access requests without using services, the ad-
ministrator may take actions, such as revoking his
authorization, on this data user to prevent denial of
service (DoS).
Based on this policy, three different attributes are
required to meet these authorizations:
• The time interval. This includes the start time and
end time for which access is permitted. At the end
time, the privilege for using data items is revoked.
• The valid period. Access to a data item can be
permitted only during the valid period of usage.
• Generalization level. The data item can only be
accessed under the authorized generalization level.
The state transition of privacy-aware access con-
trol actions is given in Figure 2. The states and ac-
tions in Figure 2 are explained bellow.
(1) Initial: the initial state of the Metadata.
(2) Data generalization: replacing a data value with
a less specific but semantically consistent value.
(3) Authorization: granting privileges of service to
data users if data users meet authorization re-
quirements of the system.
(4) Access request: a user request to access digital
objects.
(5) Checking: checking the valid period of the autho-
rization and the generalization level.
(6) Permitted and denied: if the time interval is not
expired during the valid period, an access to data
items is permitted, otherwise, denied.
(7) Accessing: during this state, data users are ac-
cessing data items. During the state of accessing,
the accessed generalization level of the data item
needs to be checked.
(8) Revoke privilege and endaccess: if the data item
is accessed in a wrong generalization level, the
system will revoke the privileges.
(9) Deny, Revoke and End: three final states. Deny
is the sate of refusing to access without revoking
privileges. Revoke is the state after the action of
revoke privileges, while End is the state after the
action of endaccess.
From the analysis of states and actions in privacy-
aware access control, it is obvious that an access is not
a simple action, but consists of a sequence of actions
and active tasks.
5 Access control policy
After each data is granted with authorizations accord-
ing to different purposes, an access request is needed
to access the data items. In this paper, we assume
that each access request is associated with an access
time and a specific purpose. It is not trivial for a sys-
tem to correctly infer the purpose of a query as the
system must correctly deduce the actual intention of
database users.
Definition 5 (Access request) An access request
is a 5-tuple (t, u, d, priv, p) where t ∈ T is the time
when the access is requested, u ∈ U is the data user
who requires the access, d ∈ D is the data item to be
accessed, priv ∈ Priv is a privilege exercised on the
data, and p ∈ P is the purpose for which the data is
going to be used.
The tuple ([ta, tb], u, d, priv, p) states that the data
user u requests to perform priv on the data item d for
purpose p in the time interval [ta, tb]. We denote R
as the set of access requests and for an access request
r ∈ R, σr(∗) refers to the element(s) ∗ in an access
request r.
For example, the access purpose r =
([10/07/2008, 20/07/2008], T om, income, read, admin)
means that between Jul. 10, 2008 and Jul. 20, 2008,
Tom requests to read the customer’s income infor-
mation for the admin purpose. Here, σr(t) refers to
the time interval [10/07/2008, 20/07/2008].
As far as an authorization is concerned, the first
step is to judge whether the authorization is valid
or not. This is checked by the valid authorization
function.
Definition 6 (Valid authorization function)
The valid authorization function is used to judge
whether the current authorization au is valid. It can
be expressed as follows:
G(r) =

au if σr(u, d, priv, p) = σau(u, d, priv, p)
and σr(t) ⊆ σau(t)
φ others
where au ∈ AU , r is an access request and σr(∗)
represents the element ∗ in r. G(r) returns an autho-
rization tuple. Except for checking the data user to
perform the privileges on data items for the same pur-
pose, the specific period of the current access request
should also be checked, whether it is valid or not ac-
cording to the period constraint of an authorization.
When it is φ, the authorization is illegal.
However, a valid authorization is not enough for
an access request. A valid authorized access request
is a request for which an authorization exists in the
current AU , which is checked by the following valid
access function.
In order to express the definition of a valid access
function conveniently, a useful expression is given for
the relationship between the data item and the gen-
eralization level. If the data item d ∈ D is accessed in
the Low generalization level under the access request
r, it is denoted by γ(d,r)(gl) = L.
Definition 7 (Valid access function) The valid
access function is used to judge whether the access
request is valid according to the current AU . It can
be expressed as follows:
F (r) =
{
true ∃G(r), (γ(d,r)(gl) = σG(r)(gl))
false others
where r is an access request. If F (r) is true, the
access is valid. Otherwise, it is invalid.
After a data user submits an access request r and
F (r) is true, the user is permitted to access the data.
During the following process of accessing, there are
three kinds of situations that should be considered.
If a requested authorization tuple is a non-time au-
thorization, the authorization au is revoked. If it is
a temporal authorization, when the time exceeds the
retention time, the au is illegal. If the data item be-
ing accessed is not in the same generalization level,
access is rejected. The implementation of the access
control policy is described in Table 6.
6 Obligations and conditions
Traditional access control, such as Mandatory Ac-
cess Control (MAC), Discretionary Access Control
(DAC), and Role Based Access Control(RBAC) (Den-
ning 1976, Sweeney 2002, Sandhu et al. 1996, Fer-
raiolo et al. 2001), are not designed to enforce privacy
policies and barely meet privacy protection require-
ments, particularly, obligations and conditions. In
these access control model, once the access or deny
ruling has been given and properly logged, nothing
more is needed from the access control function. But
sometimes privacy laws and policies require that ad-
ditional processes be started when an access of PII is
made. As noted earlier, we refer to these activities as
obligations which are incurred by the PII usage.
Some examples of such obligations might be:
• The state tax authority can use your financial
records for the purposes of an audit, but only if
the data subject of the audit is notified.
Algorithm: Access control(AU , r)
Input: an access request r and the set of current
temporal generalized authorizations AU
au = G(r); /*use the valid authorization to return
a set function of authorization tuple, and then
judge whether the authorization is valid*/
If (au = φ)
then
Return false; /*This authorization does not exist*/
if (σr(t) /∈ σau(t))
then
Return false; /*Illegal Authorization*/;
k = F (r); /*use the valid access function to return
a boolean value, with which to judge whether the
access is valid.*/
if (k = false)
then
Return false; /*Illegal Access*/;
if (γ(d,r)(gl) /∈ σG(r)(gl))
then
Return false; /*The access is rejected’*/
Table 6: Implementation of Access Control Policy
• A research company may use a data subjects hu-
man genome information for research purposes, but
only if it pays the data subject 100 AUD per year.
• A minor’s e-mail address may be used to commu-
nicate with the minor, but only if written consent
is obtained from the legal guardian within 30 days.
Generally, obligations are associated with some ac-
tion request; i.e., a subject promises to fulfill some
obligations sometime in order to perform a specific
action on some objects now. There are cases in which
specific obligations are only associated with some spe-
cial objects in the policies without reference to an ac-
tion. However, a corresponding action can still be
identified practically because usually the action mak-
ing these objects special is the action causing these
obligations.
Some obligations may be conditional; that is, con-
ditional obligations are only required to be fulfilled
if some related condition is true. Conditions typi-
cally include environmental or system-oriented deci-
sion factors. Examples are time of day and system
load. They can also include the security status of the
system, such as normal, high alert, under attack, etc.
Conditions are not under direct control of individual
subjects. Conditions, or prerequisites to be met be-
fore any action can be executed, are critical in some
cases.
7 Related Work
To date, several approaches have been reported that
deal with various aspects of the problem of high-
assurance privacy systems.
The W3Cs Platform for Privacy Preference (P3P)
(WWW) allows web sites to encode their privacy
practice, such as what information is collected, who
can access the data for what purposes, and how long
the data will be stored by the sites, in a machine-
readable format. P3P enabled browsers can read this
privacy policy automatically and compare it to the
consumers set of privacy preferences which are spec-
ified in a privacy preference language such as a P3P
preference exchange language (APPEL) (WWW),
also designed by the W3C. Even though P3P pro-
vides a standard means for enterprises to make pri-
vacy promises to their users, P3P does not provide
any mechanism to ensure that these promises are con-
sistent with the internal data processing. By contrast,
the work in our paper not only provides an effective
generalization strategy to maximize the data privacy
and usability but also provides more significant work
on how to manage the a valid access process.
The concept of Hippocratic databases that incor-
porates privacy protection within relational database
systems was introduced by Agrawal et al.(Agrawal
et al. 2002). The proposed architecture uses privacy
metadata, which consist of privacy policies and pri-
vacy authorizations stored in two tables. Byun et al.
presented a comprehensive approach for privacy pre-
serving access control based on the notion of purpose
(Byun et al. 2004, 2005). In the model, purpose in-
formation associated with a given data element spec-
ifies the intended use of the data element, and the
model allows multiple purposes to be associated with
each data element. The granularity of data labeling
is discussed in detail in (Byun et al. 2004), and a sys-
tematic approach to implement the notion of access
purposes, using roles and role-attributes is presented
in (Byun et al. 2005).
Although all these models do protect privacy of
data providers, they are very rigid and do not provide
ways to maximize the utilization of private informa-
tion. Specifically, in those models access decision is
always binary; i.e., a data access is either allowed or
denied as in most conventional access control mod-
els. Different from previous models, the novelty of
our model is that our approach can provide a much
finer level of control as the access control decision is
based on the question of “how much information can
be allowed for a certain user”, rather than “is infor-
mation allowed for a certain user or not”. In other
words, every piece of information is classified into dif-
ferent generalization levels and every user is assigned
an authorization to access the private information.
Previous work on multilevel secure relational
databases (Jajodia & Sandhu 1991, Sandhu & Chen
1998) also provides many valuable insights for design-
ing a fine-grained secure data model. In a multilevel
relational database system, every piece of informa-
tion is classified into a security level, and every user
is assigned a security clearance. Based on this access
class, the system ensures that each user gains access
to only the data for which he has proper clearance,
according to the basic restrictions. Byun and Bertino
(Byun & Bertino 2006) proposed a new class of access
control systems based on the notion of micro-view,
which applied the idea of views at the level of the
atomic components of tuples to an attribute value.
However, the model in (Byun & Bertino 2006) is not
to be considered a complete solution rather to show
some of capabilities. Some technical challenges raised
by their model have been solved in our paper. One
of the challenges is to design metrics for data pri-
vacy and data usability, we solve this challenge by in-
troducing the privacy-aware generalization boundary
technique, which can maximize the privacy and utility
for both data providers and data users. Another chal-
lenge is about applicability to genera-purpose access
control, we solve it by providing a complete access
control model with the implement of its access con-
trol policy. We further extend our proposed model by
taking obligations and conditions into acconunt.
8 Conclusions and Future work
In this paper, we present a privacy-aware access con-
trol model with generalization boundaries. The de-
vised generalization boundary technique can satisfy
the requirement of both data providers and data
users. Both privacy and usability of data items can be
achieved when the data item is generalized by using
this technique. Moreover, our approach can provide a
much finer level of control as the access control deci-
sion is based on the question of “how much informa-
tion can be allowed for a certain user”, rather than “is
information allowed for a certain user or not”. The
privacy-aware access control model we presented in
this paper provides an example for multilevel secure
relational databases.
Our proposed model provides efficient generaliza-
tion strategies for privacy preserving access control
systems, but much more work still remains to be done.
The future work includes devising a high level lan-
guage in which privacy specifications can be expressed
precisely. We also plan to extend our model to cope
with complex query processing. We will introduce the
queries with join, sub-queries or aggregations into our
model. These are challenging problems, but they are
vital elements of privacy protection.
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